Properties of Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Constant Delay Time
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14529/mmph260402Keywords:
differential games, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, time delayAbstract
This paper studies properties of Nash equilibria in a two-person nonzero-sum differential game with constant time delay. It is shown that equilibrium strategies may be non-unique and are not always efficient from the standpoint of the joint improvement of both players' criteria. Methods for overcoming these shortcomings are specified. The study employs the method of Lyapunov–Chetaev functions, developed by N.N. Krasovskii as applied to problems of analytical design of optimal controllers in time-delay systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for the existence of admissible strategies that simultaneously reduce the values of the payoff functionals of both players compared to their equilibrium values. For linear games with quadratic payoff functionals, these conditions are reduced to verifying the definite negativity of matrix functions depending on the solutions to systems of differential and differential-difference equations. Explicit forms of the improving strategies are obtained for a special case where the control matrices and the weight matrices of the criteria coincide with the identity matrix. In addition, a class of equilibria possessing the property of Pareto optimality is identified: for these, any joint deviation cannot simultaneously improve the criteria of both players. Sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality and semi-efficiency of equilibrium strategies in linear-quadratic time-delay games are specified. The results can be applied to designing robust strategies in multi-agent systems, economic models, and control problems with delayed feedback.Downloads
Published
2026-11-13






