Strongly guaranteed equilibrium in one hierarchical two-level game under uncertainty
Authors
Aleksandr Evgenievich Bardin
Moscow State Regional Institute of Humanities
Наталья Геннадьевна Солдатова
Moscow State Regional Institute of Humanities
Keywords:
hierarchical game, Nash equilibrium, principle of Savage minimax regret, vector guarantee, uncertainty
Abstract
In the article new approach to decision-making for two-level static hierarchical system under uncertain factors is considered. Formalization of the optimum solution is based on the concepts of Nash equilibrium, situational Savage regret and a vector guarantee.
Author Biographies
Aleksandr Evgenievich Bardin, Moscow State Regional Institute of Humanities
Cand. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Associate Professor, Department of Informatics
Наталья Геннадьевна Солдатова, Moscow State Regional Institute of Humanities
Senior Lecturer, Department of Mathematics and Physics
