The Cooperative Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Benefits Distribution from IT Solution Implementation

A. A. Grigoreva, A. T. Latipova

Abstract


Nowadays there are a large number of methods to estimate the efficiency of IT solutions and the effectiveness of IT project activities. Despite the existing variety of methods to assess the benefits from IT, they are not sufficient to prevent troubles caused by the situation where the launch of the project is hindered by a part of stakeholders who are uncertain about further benefits distribution or even they are afraid of the possibility about negative impact of the new IT solution on the performance indicators of departments in their subordination.

This article presents the results of the modelling the business and IT coalitions interaction while enterprise architecture development projects at the stage of choosing and approving the new IT solution. The function to measure the IT solution benefits taking into account the financial and qualitative components of benefits, the efforts of the each coalition project participation and project costs is determined. A game-theoretic model of decision-making while choosing and approving the new IT solution with objectives to incorporate the agents into one big coalition with a stable resources distribution is stated. Practical application of the developed model will allow increasing IT project efficiency in corporate structures.


Keywords


cooperative game; distribution problem; benefits from IT solutions; enterprise architecture development project; Core; Shapley value; IT service; IT management

Full Text:

PDF

References


Lankhorst M.M. Enterprise Architecture Modelling – the Issue of Integration. Advanced Engineering Informatics, 2004, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 205–216. DOI: 10.1016/j.aei.2005.01.005

Nakakawa A., Bommel P., Proper H.A. Challenges of Involving Stakeholders when Creating Enterprise Architecture. 5th SIKS/BENAIS Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, 2010, pp. 43–55.

Smolander K., Päivärinta T. Describing and Communicating Software Architecture in Practice: Observations on Stakeholders and Rationale. International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002, pp. 117–133. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-47961-9_11

Freeman R.E., McVea J. A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management. The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management, 2001, pp. 183–201. DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631218616.2006.00007.x

Jensen M.C. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2010, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 32–42. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00259.x

Von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Commemorative Edition). Princeton University Press, 1990. 666 p.

Petrosyan L.A. [Stability of Solutions of Differential Games with Many Participants]. Bulletin of Leningrad University. Series 1: Mathematics, Mechanics, Astronomy, 1977, no. 19, pp. 46–52. (in Russ.)




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14529/ctcr180316

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.